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 THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY 1900-1939:  
FROM CRISIS TO ASCENDANCY 
 
Philip Williamson 
 
In recent years early twentieth-century Conservative politics has generated two large 
interpretative debates.  Between 1903 and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 a 
'crisis of Conservatism' has been identified: fierce internal disputes and three successive 
general election defeats, which exposed the party's deepest commitments to attack.  How is 
this crisis to be understood?  In contrast, between the armistice in 1918 and the onset of the 
Second World War in 1939 the party secured a remarkable ascendancy.  It obtained more 
votes than any other party at every general election, won three of the largest-ever House of 
Commons majorities, and occupied government after five of the seven elections, and was in 
opposition for in total just 36 months.  How was such dominance achieved?1 
 The historical literature on these subjects contains pitfalls for the unwary.  The 
contrast between crisis and ascendancy can be exaggerated, if each condition is overstated 
and then 'over-explained' as the outcome of social, electoral or organisational structures.  
Amidst the  pre-war crisis the party's popular support remained substantial: in the two 1910 
general elections it won nearly as many votes as Liberals and Labour combined.  From 1918 
to 1930 its position was less secure than hindsight suggests: in most elections it obtained a 
considerably lower share of the national vote than it had during its pre-war defeats.  The 
Edwardian party's divisions might seem ample proof of weakness, yet internal disputes of 
similar proportions occurred during the party's interwar dominance.  An assumption that 
divisions within a party are automatically damaging should be resisted, for these bring defeat 
only if they affect the fundamental concerns of a decisive number of voters on polling day.  
Otherwise internal differences are a normal – and generally healthy – condition of any 
political party's life.  This is not only because competitiveness is endemic among ambitious 
politicians.  Conservatives were a complex association of different types of members 
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supported by combinations of different types of voters, with various interests and various 
opinions, agreeing on some broad matters but otherwise with disparate, and often not wholly 
consistent, concerns.  Contrary to many incautious generalisations, they cannot be understood 
in any straightforward economic or social terms, as the party of property-owners or the 
middle classes.  Propertied and middle-class groups were also numerous – and their interests 
given high priority – within the Liberal party and among its supporters.2  About half the total 
Conservative vote in parliamentary elections came from the labouring population, and in the 
1930s more of the 'working class' voted Conservative than Labour.   
 Even the terms 'Conservative party' and 'Conservative government' can cause 
confusion, because commonly used as shorthand phrases which obscure significant aspects of 
the party's strategy and presentation.  The party was usually allied with other groups, and 
normally described itself and the governments containing its leaders in broader terms than 
just 'Conservative'.  From 1886 what some historians call the 'Conservative party' was 
actually a Unionist alliance between Conservative and Liberal Unionist parties, which from 
1895 to 1905 formed a 'Unionist government'.  In 1912 the two parties merged into the 
'Unionist party'.  From 1915 to 1922 Unionists were partners with Liberal and Labour groups 
in successive 'coalition governments'.  In 1925 the party in England and Wales – though not 
in Scotland and Northern Ireland – reverted to the name 'Conservative', while retaining the 
term 'and Unionist'.  From 1931 to 1940 Conservative and Unionist leaders joined new 
Liberal and Labour splinter groups in another coalition, the 'National government'.  During its 
interwar ascendancy the Conservative party only twice won elections without declared 
national alliances, in 1922 and 1924, and even then it benefitted from regional or local 
electoral pacts with Liberals.  When genuinely fighting alone, at the 1923 and 1929 elections, 
it lost.  Only in 1922-24 and 1924-29 were there strictly 'Conservative governments'.3   
 Nor are these the only reasons why examination of Conservatives alone is insufficient 
to explain the party's electoral performance.  Just as success could be connected with political 
alliances, so could defeat – by co-operation among its opponents.  Electoral support could 
depend not just on the Conservative party’s own resources, but on contrasts established with 
competing parties or alliances.  Each party's activities and appeal, and its success or failure, 
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were shaped largely by dynamics generated by the party system, which in this period always 
contained at least three substantial parties and often more.  Consequently political decisions – 
arguments, images, strategies, alliances and issues – were at least as important as economic, 
class or electoral structure and party organisation in determining the Unionist and 
Conservative record.  
 
i. the Edwardian crisis  
The Unionist alliance, since 1886 the strongest political force, increased its parliamentary 
majority at the September 1900 general election.  Over the next five years the Unionist 
government undertook important diplomatic, defence, administrative, educational and social 
initiatives.  In July 1902 the premiership passed smoothly from one member of the 
aristocratic and Conservative Cecil family to another, from Lord Salisbury to his nephew, 
Balfour.  Yet from May 1903 the government was in difficulties, as Cabinet disagreement 
over proposals from the Liberal Unionist Joseph Chamberlain for 'tariff reform' – duties on 
imported foreign commodities, with preference (reductions) for colonial imports – led to 
resignations and dismissals, splits within the alliance parties (both Conservative and Liberal 
Unionist), creation of rival Free Food and Tariff Reform Leagues, and widespread criticism of 
Balfour's leadership.  After the Cabinet finally resigned in December 1905, the new Liberal 
government called a general election in January 1906 which resulted in a Unionist collapse, to 
just 157 MPs, considerably fewer than half the Liberal numbers (table 1).    
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 1: GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS 1895-1910 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
  UNIONISTS   LIBERAL   LABOUR        IRISH NATIONALIST 
   % poll    MPs  (LU)* [unoppo]+ % poll    MPs  % poll    MPs              MPs# 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
1895  49.1 411   (71)    [132] 45.7 177  -  -  82 
1900  50.3 402   (68)    [163]  45.0 183 1.3   2      82 
1906  43.4 157   (25)     [ 13] 49.4 399 4.8  29      83 
Jan.1910 46.8 272   (32)     [ 19] 43.5       274  7.0  40      82 
Dec.1910 46.6 271   (36)     [ 72] 44.2 272  6.4  42      84 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 * Liberal Unionist MPs, included in overall Unionist total 
 + total of Unionist MPs unopposed by rival candidates 
 # most Irish nationalist MPs were returned unopposed, so their percentage of the poll is meaningless 
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Source: adapted from F.W.S.Craig, British Electoral Facts 1832-1980 (Chichester, 1981) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Difficulties persisted in opposition, even after Chamberlain's withdrawal due to ill-health in 
July.  Prolonged doctrinal disputes, rumbling indiscipline and two further election defeats in 
1910 constitute an extraordinary phase in Unionist-Conservative politics, contrary to a usually 
firm instinct for collective self-preservation and pragmatic pursuit of power.  A pioneering 
Conservative party historian, Robert Blake, confessed to being 'baffled' by the Unionists' 
behaviour, which appeared to him almost like some 'political death wish'.4  It has seemed 
consistent with further remarkable episodes before the outbreak of war in 1914: outright 
rebellions, Balfour's displacement, and challenges to established political conventions.  
Nevertheless, although recent interpretations posit a continuous Edwardian 'crisis of 
Conservatism', conceptually the period divides into two distinct phases, separated in 1910.    
 Understanding has turned chiefly on tariff reform, as the cause of internal rupture and 
chief reason for the scale of the 1906 election defeat.  The issue is commonly presented as a 
clash between the two leading Unionist personalities, symbolising different types of politics.  
Following the unexpectedly protracted and expensive Boer War of 1899-1902, Chamberlain, 
as colonial secretary the minister chiefly responsible, became a dangerously combustible 
figure: he wanted to restore imperial strength, he had lost influence, and he wished to re-
establish his authority and reputation.  As his tariff reform proposals attracted considerable 
interest and controversy, he resigned from the Cabinet to campaign for their acceptance as the 
chief Unionist policy.  In doing so, Chamberlain reverted to the techniques of his career as a 
radical Liberal before 1886: those of a populist cause, a programme, and an organisation.  
This new, energetic, radical version of Unionist politics was attractive to many Conservatives 
and Liberal Unionists, dissatisfied with the older, cooler, mandarin style of the Cecilian 
leadership of the Unionist alliance. Balfour's efforts to preserve a semblance of unity through 
sinuous compromises exasperated tariff reformers, free traders and neutrals alike, who all 
supplied ammunition for an historical verdict that he bore much responsibility for the 
Unionist collapse.  Balfour is blamed for failing to provide clear leadership, perpetuating the 
divisions, demoralising government supporters, and losing voters. In contrast Chamberlain 
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and the tariff reformers are presented as modernising forces, creating a positive Unionist 
appeal attuned to the politics of a mass electorate. 
 Increasingly, a clash of personalities and styles has seemed an insufficient 
explanation, and wider interpretations have been sought.  Tariff reform is now regarded as 
one reaction to a general anxiety, manifested in all political parties and intensified by the 
strains of the Boer War, about British 'relative decline': increased commercial and imperial 
competition from other nations; reduced economic, administrative and military effectiveness; 
greater demands on government finance; and realization of the chronic poverty, bad health 
and poor education among much of the labouring population.  Tariff reform attracted 
commitment because it seemed the most definite Unionist contribution to what Geoffrey 
Searle has called 'the quest for national efficiency':5 short-term party considerations were 
outweighed by deeper imperial and political imperatives.  To this explanation has been added 
emphasis on electoral and party pressures, particularly the delayed effects from the 
enfranchisement of most male labourers in 1884.  According to Alan Sykes tariff reform was 
politically seductive because it was flexible, offering multiple appeals and serving changing 
purposes.  Chamberlain's own primary concern was imperial unity, but his programme was 
extended to embrace protection of domestic agriculture and industries, increased employment, 
higher wages and social reform, as he and his acolytes sought wider support from farmers, 
rural landlords, manufacturers and especially working-class voters.  Paradoxically the 1906 
election defeat made the issue of tariff reform seem more compelling, because it now became 
a positive alternative to 'socialism', as represented by the Labour party's electoral advance and 
later by the Liberal government's collectivist social policies.6   In the most comprehensive 
examination, Ewen Green argued that tariff reform offered solutions to three interrelated 
problems of political identity.  First, Unionist credibility as champions of national and 
imperial power had suffered from the public anxiety about 'national efficiency'.  Second, as 
the Unionists' social base expanded from the landed interest to 'property in general', tensions 
developed between traditional rural and newer urban propertied supporters. Third and most 
seriously, as a combination of property-owners the Unionist alliance could suffer from any 
growth of class politics, as this would distance it from the largely 'propertyless' electorate.  
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The function of tariff reform was as 'an economics of political integration', offering a 
restructured party identity which might consolidate natural adherents and increase mass 
support.7 
 An identity crisis there certainly was, but questions arise over its definition.  Green's 
account turns on a characterisation of the 'Conservative party' as the 'party of property and 
Empire'.  If this had really been so, its internal difficulties would have been fewer and its 
electoral performance quite different.  The Unionist alliance existed to defend the 
constitutional union with Ireland, while the primary Conservative party purpose – accepted to 
greater or lesser degree by their Liberal Unionist partners – was to uphold established 
political institutions and the established churches.  Around these fundamental principles 
further interests and anti-Liberal opinions had assembled since the 1880s, giving the Unionist 
alliance a broad-based electoral appeal which both bridged and bisected socio-economic 
distinctions in complex regional patterns.  It had attracted many (but far from all) urban and 
suburban property-owners, especially in southern England. Contrary to a common 
interpretation that its success depended on minimising the mass vote by exploiting low 
electoral registration and turn-outs, it also had substantial 'working-class' support from the 
cultures of public houses, mass sports, friendly societies, paternalistic employers and the 
established churches, mobilised by Conservative working-men's clubs and the Primrose 
League, from popular Protestant, anti-Catholic and anti-Irish feeling (notably in Lancashire 
and West Scotland), and from workers in defence bases and industries, all mobilised by 
Unionist workin men’s clubs and the Primrose League.  The Unionist leadership was not 
hostile to trade unions, and it had a record of social reform and promised more, including old 
age pensions until postponed by the cost of the Boer War.  The liberal traditions of Liberal 
Unionism remained significant in Scotland, the west Midlands and south-west England, not 
just in the number of its own MPs [see table 1] but also in lubricating the appeal of their 
Conservative allies.  The advantage of many Unionist MPs returned unopposed by rival 
candidates (as many as 163 at the 1900 election) arose not only from Liberal weakness, but 
often from Unionist popular strength.  This broad-based support was held together by a 
widely-accepted association of 'Unionism' with 'national' interests and imperial strength, 
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contrasted with the Liberal party's supposed sectional and sectarian  concerns – home rule for 
Ireland, 'faddist' programmes, and puritanical nonconformist efforts to regulate and restrict 
'the pleasures of the people', including alcohol consumption.8 
 In the early 1900s this position was reversed – the outcome not of Unionist actions 
alone, but also of intelligent Liberal strategy, especially by injecting a moral charge into 
leading issues.  Unionism was made to seem self-interested and unprincipled, and the liberal 
claims of Liberal Unionism were tarnished, enabling the Liberal party to secure the moral 
high ground, extend its electoral appeal, and to contest many more constituencies.  The 
Unionist government's 1902 Education Act and 1904 Licensing Act were presented as merely 
partisan support for Anglican church schools and the brewing interest, enabling Liberals to 
tap an outraged political nonconformity able to provide considerable assistance in 
organisation, funds and candidates.  Government hesitation in nullifying hostile legal 
decisions on trade union rights (especially the ‘Taff Vale case’) was exploited with the 
Liberal-Labour electoral pact of 1903, which assisted many Liberal candidates as well as 
giving the Labour party a vital boost.  Irish home rule was relegated from an immediate 
Liberal aim to an unspecified future, which deflated electoral hostility towards Liberals in 
mainland Britain and removed a leading source of Unionist solidarity.  The government's 
imperial policy was made to seem immoral as well as ramshackle and expensive, with 
accusations of 'Chinese slavery' (harsh treatment of indentured Chinese labourers) in South 
Africa reinforcing earlier charges of 'methods of barbarism' ('concentration camps' for Boer 
families).  Above all, tariff reform was presented not just as economically injurious but also 
as socially, politically and morally offensive, by being relentlessly stereotyped as 'protection' 
in the sense of advantages given to the vested interests of employers by means of taxes on the 
food of the masses. 
 Among Unionists themselves, tariff reform was corrosive for several reasons.  
Unionist 'free fooders' criticised it on similar grounds to those of  Liberals (and some, 
including Churchill, joined the Liberal party).  Balfour and his supporters assumed that 
electorally it was not 'practical politics', because many labourers would place their immediate 
concerns as consumers before uncertain promises to them as producers.  Still more 
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damagingly, it substituted a new programme for the priorities which had defined the party 
system since 1886, disregarding the established Unionist identity and the bases of a successful 
electoral combination.  What to tariff reformers seemed a politics of integration was to 
Balfourites a politics of disintegration, jeopardising the fundamental Unionist function of 
constitutional defence.    
 This was a cogent view, one which deserves greater historical respect in the light of 
Unionist vulnerability after the first 1910 election and the Liberal attacks on established 
institutions.  It also goes far towards explaining how, through all the criticism, Balfour so 
long remained an unchallengeable leader: his determination to preserve the widest Unionist 
interests, by resistance to activists who unwittingly narrowed the Unionist appeal and played 
into Liberal hands.  The position could not be salvaged before the 1906 election, and 
afterwards pressures from well-organised Chamberlainite majorities among Unionist MPs and 
in the National Union obliged Balfour to concede successive versions of tariff reform.  
Nevertheless the three years from 1906 to 1909 revealed the possibilities of his strategy of 
minimising that issue as far as practicable, while maximising matters of traditional difference 
between Unionists and Liberals.  Tariff reform, originally a policy of radical change, was 
subordinated to the priorities of conservative defence.  A campaign of selective opposition to 
the Liberal government was adopted on the public platform as well as by the Unionist 
majority in the House of Lords – resistance to legislation on nonconformist and radical issues, 
notably education, licensing and land tenure, but acceptance of less controversial trade union, 
old age pensions, and other social reform measures, on which, indeed, many Unionists were 
sympathetic.  Doubts were also raised about the government's commitment to upholding 
national interests in the world, especially the preservation of naval dominance over Germany.  
By these means the sctarian interests and sectionalism of Liberals and their allies was 
exposed, their divisions widened, and Liberal ministers demoralised.  A series of Unionist by-
election victories in 1907-8 indicated a substantial electoral recovery, encouraged greater 
unity and promised an end to Unionist 'crisis'. 
 Liberal determination as much as Unionist miscalculation again explains why the 
eventual outcome was very different.  The 1909 'people's budget' brought to a climax the 
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issue of Unionist obstruction of Liberal legislation in the House of Lords – Lloyd George's 
'peers versus the people' – but at first Unionist leaders considered the budget as not just a 
vindictive 'socialistic' attack upon landed property, but also an opportunity to force and win 
an early general election.  Almost all Unionists, including earlier free-traders, now acquiesced 
in tariff reform, but only in a further narrowing of its purpose to that of a tactical device and 
financial policy, offering indirect revenue from imports as the alternative to Lloyd George's 
increased direct taxes.  As expected, the House of Lords' defeat of the budget did precipitate a 
general election, in January 1910, and while it did not produce a Unionist victory it seemed at 
first to have created serious problems for their rivals.  A large proportion of the 'people' had 
supported 'the peers', costing the Liberal party its overall parliamentary majority and leaving  
Irish Nationalist MPs holding the balance of power between Liberals and Unionists (table 1).  
However, the now minority Liberal government arrived at a momentous solution, confirmed 
at a second election in December 1910, which began a new phase of severe Unionist 
difficulties. 
 Recent historical interest in the 1910 elections has concentrated chiefly on the extent 
to which a 'new Liberalism' captured an emerging 'working-class' consciousness and 
consolidated the Liberal pact with the Labour party.  But this was not their major feature.  Nor 
should the 'class alignment' be overstated.  The Liberal government's measures were selective, 
seeking to retain its own substantial propertied support.  While the higher Unionist vote did 
comprise increased numbers of taxpayers hostile to Liberal financial and social policies, it 
continued to include many labourers persuaded by Unionist criticisms of the Liberal Cabinet 
and disliking Lloyd George's other new taxes, on popular consumption of alcohol and 
tobacco.  The larger outcome of the two elections did not lie in a social-democratic 
'Progressive' Liberal-Labour alliance and shift towards class politics.  Rather, the main 
features were a revival of the Radical Liberal-Irish Nationalist alliance of the 1880s and 
1890s, and a reinstatement of constitutional issues.  Constitutional politics were now 
conducted with a vengeance – because the Irish Nationalist condition for alliance was a 
Parliament Bill abolishing the House of Lords' powers of veto, with the effect of re-
establishing Home Rule as an immediate and achievable policy.  It also cleared the way for 
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other longstanding radical aims, especially another visceral issue for many Unionists, 
inadequately emphasised in party histories – the nonconformist cause of disestablishment and 
disendowment of the Anglican Church of Wales.9 
 All this revived the Unionist identity crisis, because it re-opened the question of 
primary purpose – constitutional defence or tariff reform?   Forced by the 'Radical 
government' into a stark choice, the core Unionist identity was reaffirmed: even most tariff 
reformers ultimately placed the constitution before tariffs.  But this reversion to fundamental 
priorities was even more painful and disruptive than the diversion from them had been after 
1902, and it generated a remarkable change in Unionist political style.10  Many who had 
reluctantly accepted tariff reform in the hope of defeating the Liberal government now 
concluded that it had failed and should be sacrificed for the greater cause.  But Balfour's 
attempt before the December 1910 election to defuse the issue by offering to submit tariff 
reform to a future public referendum infuriated the 'whole-hog' tariff reformers.  Yet Balfour 
also lost the confidence of many Unionists on the constitutional issue, after another Liberal 
ministerial coup was revealed: the King's promise, if necessary, to create enough new Liberal 
peers to overcome Unionist opposition to the Parliament Bill in the House of Lords.  Balfour 
argued that it was better to let the Bill pass and rely on the Lords' residual power to delay 
legislation until a general election, than to have Liberals obtain an immediate and enduring 
House of Lords majority which could endorse radical measures whenever it wished.  But his 
advice was publicly rejected by members of his shadow cabinet and a large contingent of 
Unionist peers and MPs – the 'diehards' – who were exasperated with yet more compromise, 
to the extent of trying the high-risk tactic of outright defiance of the government. This in turn 
caused a further split, as other Unionist peers considered the risks so great that against their 
personal preferences they voted with the government to save the Parliament Bill. 
 The significance of these bitter Unionist divisions is not just that they finally forced 
Balfour's resignation from the leadership, in November 1911.  They were manifestations of a 
more general eruption of Unionist discontent, sometimes characterised as a 'revolt from the 
right'.  Though mobilised in numerous organisations, the shared features included intensified  
'national efficiency' anxieties, expressed as ultra-patriotism, imperialism and xenophobia, 
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versions of tariff reform, and desire for stronger armed forces.  To these were added hostility 
towards the rising power of Germany, support for Irish Unionists and especially the Protestant 
Ulster loyalists, and a populist belief that 'the people' would support all these causes if only 
they had clear, firm and honest leadership.  One group, the 'social-imperialists', were 
distinctive as doctrinaire Chamberlainites with a contempt for parliamentary politics and a 
technocratic belief in government by policy experts.  But these were a tiny minority, and it is 
the larger and more diffuse body of Unionist dissidents that has raised interpretative 
problems.  Gregory Phillips showed that while the 'diehard' peers wanted to preserve the 
hierarchical social order, they were not fossilised 'backwoodsmen' but men active in public 
life and often favouring 'national efficiency' military and social reforms.  For Searle the 
impatience with conventional party politics, the extreme language, and the advocacy of armed 
resistance against Germany and Irish home rule defined these dissentients as a 'radical right', 
rebelling against the political structure in a manner similar to the later fascists.  In contrast 
Sykes explained the dogmatism and intransigence in more limited terms: as reactions to 
exceptional circumstances, yet serving a conventional purpose – the restoration of traditional 
conservative principles.  The well-known proliferation of political 'leagues' (including Navy, 
National Service, Budget Protest, Union Defence as well as Tariff Reform leagues), can also 
be interpreted in alternative ways: as repudiations of the party system, or as a clash between 
'old' and 'new' politics or, less dramatically, as single-cause pressure groups which could be 
accommodated within, and gain new supporters for, the Unionist alliance.11 
 The disruptive potential of the right was gradually contained under Balfour's 
replacement, Bonar Law.  On tariff reform and Ulster the new leader shared their 
perspectives, but above all he shared their enmity towards Liberal ministers.  The 
intemperance of Unionist politics from 1910 arose less from structural tensions than from 
specific political acts: the prolongation and radicalisation of Liberal government.  Without 
these, Unionist anxiety and anger about national efficiency and policy would have been much 
less, or not risen at all.  Nor would the political system have been so criticised, for the real 
grievances were not with party politics as such but with Liberal success and a Unionist 
leadership unable to check it.  The Unionist 'crisis' now consisted of a politics of frustration 
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and desperation, given a still fiercer edge by conviction of Liberal iniquity.  Ministers were 
considered to have sacrificed principle for office; to have surrendered national interests to the 
sectional ambitions of Irish Nationalists and nonconformists; to have introduced 
constitutional changes without an electoral mandate; and to have violated constitutional 
convention by coercing the King, crippling the Lords, and establishing single-chamber 
government.  The ministers were also regarded as hypocritical and corrupt, provoking class 
envy against landed property-owners while flattering the financial 'plutocracy', selling 
political honours and, with the Marconi scandal, indulging in insider-share dealing.   
 Bonar Law voiced this sense of an illegitimate and amoral Radical coalition, in an 
abrasive style of opposition which went far towards restoring Unionist morale and confidence 
in the official leadership.  Assisted by reform and unification of the party organisations after 
the 1910 election defeats and by the common cause of opposition to the Irish Home Rule and 
Welsh Church bills from 1912, Unionism again seemed an effective force.  A parliamentary 
war of obstruction exhausted Liberal ministers and whips, while public defiance, including 
Law's ringing endorsement of the Ulster loyalists, tested Cabinet resolve to the utmost. Quite 
how far he was prepared to take opposition – whether the party would depart from its normal 
commitment to law and order by supporting armed resistance in Ulster – remains debatable.  
It seems most likely that Law's strategy was less extreme than his rhetoric.  He aimed to 
intimidate the Liberal Cabinet into making concessions, accepting a partitioned Ireland which 
would exclude Ulster from home rule, and allowing more generous treatment of the Welsh 
Church.  Above all, he wanted to force a general election that would halt all its radical 
proposals, including Lloyd Georgian finance and his new campaign for land reform.  The 
measure of the changed condition of Unionist politics came in the winter of 1912-13, when 
Law and his shadow cabinet proposed to restore tariff reform as party policy.  This produced 
a backbench rebellion, because most Unionists had now finally grasped that tariff reform 
jeopardised constitutional defence; and when Law offered to resign, tariff reformers joined 
the movement to persuade him to remain party leader while setting the policy aside. 
 Edwardian Unionist politics can be epitomised as the rise and fall of tariff reform, 
connected with a burgeoning class politics.  But this misrepresents their character and 
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complexity.  A more accurate understanding lies in a different symmetry: an eclipse and 
revival of conservative Unionism, turning on a constitutional politics which supplied a focus 
for further conservative interests and opinions.  Although economic and social issues were 
becoming important in party politics, these did not yet define the distinctions between parties.  
Unionism continued to draw strength from issues cutting across perceptions of class, enabling 
it to rebuild a broad electoral appeal after the erosions suffered between 1903 and the 1906 
election. The new aspect that constitutional politics had acquired was Unionist belligerence, 
creating a dangerous condition of mutual brinkmanship by the rival party leaders.  But by July 
1914 the Liberal Cabinet had been forced into negotiation over Ulster and was itself divided 
over Lloyd George's latest budget, while a strong Unionist by-election performance, giving 
the party 30 more MPs than the Liberals, showed that it was restored to at least equal terms 
with the Radical alliance.  
 
ii.  interwar ascendancy 
Even if Unionists had won a general election in 1915, their dominance after 1918 could not 
have been predicted.  So great was the change in Unionist fortunes that it has been explained 
as an outcome of that massive dislocation, the First World War.  Some domestic effects of the 
War undoubtedly helped the Unionist position.  The party's anti-Germanism and calls for 
stronger armed forces, its brand of patriotism and insistence on the value of the Empire, even 
a version of tariff reform – protection of strategic industries – were all vindicated.  Its 
unqualified commitment to the war effort, accepting drastic extensions of state power, 
matched the predominant public attitude and the demands of 'mass mobilisation'.  Its leaders 
agreed to a wartime electoral truce, and although protesting at the enactment of the Irish and 
Welsh bills in September 1914, the Liberal government's decision to suspend operation of 
these bills for the duration of the war enabled the constitutional issues separating the rival 
party leaderships to be set aside.  This eased a Unionist return to government as junior 
partners in the Asquith coalition of May 1915, then as the main constituents of the Lloyd 
George coalition from December 1916.  Most importantly, the Radical alliance disintegrated.  
The Liberal party split into Asquithian and Lloyd Georgian factions, which fought the first 
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two post-war elections as rival groups.  The Labour party decided in 1918 to break with 
Liberals and become a genuinely independent national party.  The Irish Nationalist party 
collapsed after the Easter rising in 1916, and the MPs of its republican successor, Sinn Fein, 
refused to attend the Westminster Parliament.  At the December 1918 general election, 
Unionists became by far the largest parliamentary party, with nearly as many MPs as in 1900 
(table 2).     
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 2: GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS 1918-1945 (main political groups only) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
                 UN/ CONS      Un/Cons allies & others*    LIBERAL LABOUR  
  % poll    MPs % poll    MPs   % poll    MPs % poll    MPs 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
1918  38.8 382 14.6 141   13.0 36 20.8  57 
1922  38.5 344 [9.9     53]         18.9       62          29.7       142 
1923  38.0 258   -             -   29.7       158 30.7 191 
1924  46.8 412   1.2 7   17.8 40 33.3 151 
1929  38.1 260  - -   23.5 59 37.1 287 
1931  55.0 470 12.2 84   [Cons allies] 30.9  52 
1935  47.8 387  5.5 42   6.7 21 38.0 154 
1945  36.2 197 3.4           13   9.0         12          48.0       393 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 * 1918 chiefly Lloyd George Liberals (127 MPs) 
    1922  Lloyd George Liberals, many elected through local pacts with Unionists (but rejoined Liberals 
  in 1923)  
    1924  'Constitutionalists': in addition, there were numerous local electoral pacts between  
  Unionist and Liberals. 
    1931 National (4 MPs), National Labour (13), National Liberal (35), Liberal (32, most of whom  
 ceased to be government supporters in 1932)   
   1935 National (1), National Labour (8) and National Liberal (33)  
Source: adapted from Craig, British Electoral Facts 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Yet Bonar Law had not felt his party strong enough to fight alone.  The election was 
won not by Unionists alone but by the coalition government, with Lloyd George as prime 
minister and with an alliance between Unionists and his Liberal followers.  Even four years 
later most Unionist leaders wanted to continue this coalition.  The War had created problems 
as well as opportunities for the party – some potentially fatal to Unionist interests.  It 
transformed the political agenda, creating new issues and priorities (as is often and rightly 
emphasised) without wholly replacing older controversies and values (less frequently 
emphasised).  Mass mobilisation, increased state reliance on labour and businessmen, and 
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promises of post-war social reconstruction, all elevated economic and social questions into 
central policy concerns.  With the Labour party adopting socialism as the aim of independent 
working-class politics, underpinned by a stronger trade union movement, a new rival had 
emerged and challenged Unionism precisely and fundamentally on the new priorities.  The 
challenge seemed especially formidable given two additional sources of unsettlement: the 
strains of re-adjustment to peace, with a vast demobilisation which some Unionists feared 
might generate a revolutionary crisis similar to that suffered in Russia; and the 1918 electoral 
reform, almost trebling the size of the electorate from 7.7 millions (in 1910) to over 21m, of 
whom over 70% had never voted before and around (a different) 75% were working-class 
voters.  Faced with an intensification of class politics, Unionist leaders feared that their 'Party 
on the old lines [would] have no future'12 and sought safety in a peacetime coalition.  
Although this combination  smothered the Labour electoral threat at the 1918 election, this 
was plainly only a temporary check.  After severe industrial unrest, inflammatory socialist 
rhetoric, and Labour by-election successes, in 1920 Unionist ministers even considered 
abandoning their party's separate existence, by fusing with their Liberal coalition partners in a 
new anti-socialist party. 
 One effect of the War's political repercussions did endure – renewed problems of 
party identity, more profound than those before 1914 and displayed in more frequent internal 
disputes.  Difficulties emerged even under the wartime coalitions.  Unionists at all levels did 
not readily accept their leaders' judgment that new conditions required suppression of earlier 
commitments.  Many disliked their willingness to compromise on Irish home rule after the 
Easter rising in 1916, and were appalled by the Irish treaty of 1921.  Some disliked a Welsh 
church compromise of 1918-19.  Party activists complained at delays in a promised House of 
Lords reform, to redress the Parliament Act.  Post-war pressures on imperial relationships 
created new areas of disagreement, over responses to nationalist agitations, especially in 
India.  Tariff reform advocates, encouraged by new justifications and new support for the 
issue generated by the Labour threat and after 1920 by economic depression and rising 
unemployment, found the leadership as resistant to their full policy as it had been before 
1910, except for a delirious period in late 1923.  Above all, the transformed policy agenda 
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and party system required a re-definition of Unionism – yet quite different versions were 
possible.  How should the Labour movement be treated? what should be the relationship 
towards Liberals?  where should Unionists stand on the new socio-economic issues which 
now defined party differences?  There were no agreed answers.  Post-war economic problems 
and an enlargement of state activity generated considerable discontent in the Unionist 
electoral heartlands – with inflation in 1919-20, high taxes and rates, increased social 
expenditure, and what was regarded as excessive coalition government sensitivity towards the 
unemployed, the trade unions and the Labour party.  Discontent was fomented by a new style 
of 'conservative' mass circulation newspapers, owned by 'press lords' (Northcliffe, 
Rothermere, and Beaverbrook) whose pretensions to political power independent of the party 
system was a further legacy of the War.  The newspapers read by most interwar Conservatives 
were usually critical of the Conservative party leadership. 
 The outcome in the early 1920s was a proliferation of business, middle-class, 
imperialist and taxpayers associations as considerable as that of the pre-war leagues.  Though 
aimed initially against the Coalition government and especially Lloyd George, regarded as 
undermining Unionist and propertied interests, they increasingly turned against Unionist 
ministers for remaining loyal to the coalition.  A Rothermere-inspired party, the Anti-Waste 
League, obtained significant support in 1921, and a revived diehard group of peers and MPs 
ominously claimed in early 1922 to be the true 'Conservative party'.  Both sponsored 
'independent' parliamentary candidates, in some constituencies capturing local Unionist 
associations and in others fighting against official Unionist candidates. Consciousness of this 
backbench and constituency discontent magnified points of difference among Unionist party 
organisers and ministers, until the party was split right up to Cabinet level.13  At the Carlton 
Club meeting on 19 October 1922,  Austen Chamberlain, the party leader since April 1921, 
argued that fighting the next general election under Lloyd George was the only sure way to 
resist socialism.  Nevertheless he was defeated by a large majority of MPs, 185 to 88.  So 
intense was the disagreement that Chamberlain and other senior Unionist ex-ministers, the 
'Chamberlainites', refused to serve in a Unionist government – the first in seventeen years – 
formed by Bonar Law, reluctantly returning from retirement to become prime minister. 
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 The November 1922 general election seemed to vindicate the anti-coalitionist claim 
that the Unionist party could succeed on its own – and it did so despite its divided leadership.  
Yet re-assertion of the party's independence by no means guaranteed its longer-term 
dominance.  It won the election on a low national vote, just 38.5%.  It had not been truly 
independent, with Unionist-Lloyd George Liberal pacts in 159 constituencies.  A large Labour 
electoral advance placed it on the brink of becoming a party of government.  Not only was the 
Unionist leadership split; major issues concerning the party's stance and policies remained 
unresolved.  Although the leadership did eventually reunite on an agreed strategy in 1924, 
wider co-operation remained fragile, as became obvious in another party crisis after election 
defeat in 1929.  Again there were rebellions, newspaper-inspired electoral challenges – 
Beaverbrook's Empire Crusade and Rothermere's United Empire party – and attempts to 
remove the party leader.  What should be asked is not just how Unionist-Conservative 
dominance was achieved, but also how the party was held together. 
 In considering the dominance John Ramsden, Martin Pugh and Stuart Ball emphasise 
a combination of new structures – the balance of parliamentary seats, the composition of the 
electorate, and the party system – and the party's organisational responses, including use of 
the mass media.14  The 1921 Irish Treaty confirmed Sinn Fein's secession and removed 70-80 
anti-Unionist MPs from the House of Commons, leaving 10-12 Ulster MPs as a Unionist 
asset.  The 1918 electoral reform gave Unionists another 30-40 safe seats, chiefly by a 
redistribution of constituencies in favour of suburban areas, bringing a total of some 180-200 
constituencies described as 'middle-class' or 'agricultural' which were normally Unionist.  
Ramsden goes so far as to state that this new pattern of seats made Unionists into 'the natural 
majority party'.15  Moreover, the largest group enfranchised in 1918 were married and 
propertied women over 30, and even after the female franchise was equalised with that of 
men at the age of 21 in 1928 a majority of women voted Conservative.  During the 1920s 
these electoral conditions were magnified by a high number of three-party constituency 
contests, where Labour and Liberal candidates often divided the anti-Conservative vote and 
so enabled Conservative candidates to win with only a minority of votes (table 3).   
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Table 3:  NUMBER OF THREE-CORNERED CONSTITUENCY CONTESTS  AT GENERAL   
  ELECTIONS 1900-1935 
 
 1900     7   1918  211 
 1906  45   1922  212 
 Jan.1910 46   1923  254 
 Dec.1910 16   1924  223 
      1929  447 
      1931    99 
      1935  146 
 
Source: adapted from Craig, British Electoral Facts 
 
These structural advantages were reaped by an organisation superior to that of the other 
parties: the largest individual membership, better financed, more firmly established in more 
constituencies, with more professional agents.  It established a training college for party 
workers and specialist organisations for new voters, especially women and the young.16  It 
published huge amounts of propaganda material, and as early as 1924 employed commercial 
advertising agencies for election campaigns.  It operated a covert newspaper agency, mastered 
the new medium of radio broadcasts, and was particularly innovative in the use of film.17  By 
these various means, the party was more successful than its rivals in reaching and mobilising 
members of the greatly enlarged electorate. 
 These structural and organisational features were certainly important, but without 
further analysis they are essentially descriptions, assuming rather than explaining Unionist-
Conservative strength.  Quantity and efficiency of propaganda and media access are to little 
purpose without effective messages.  Good organisation and large membership were as much 
an outcome as a cause of party strength – and Unionist candidates could succeed even where 
there were organisational failings.18  The reasons for mass female Conservatism are elusive, 
while any advantage from the changed pattern of parliamentary seats depends on the equation 
of 'middle class' with Conservative.  Yet the middle classes comprised groups with diverse 
interests, some by no means 'natural' Unionist supporters and others unreliable, prone to 
abstention or defection to other parties or interest groups.  Anti-Waste, the Empire Crusade, 
and the 'United Empire' each caused difficulties for Conservative associations in some 
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regions, while the Liberal party, after its reunification in 1923, remained a serious non-
socialist alternative to Conservatism.  The three-party electoral effect could as easily operate 
against Conservatives as in their favour, because in numerous constituencies Liberal  
intervention was more likely to divide the anti-Labour than the anti-Conservative vote. For 
this reason the Liberal party, though now weaker than Labour, was the chief electoral threat to 
the Conservative party.  The two interwar Conservative defeats, at the 1923 and 1929 general 
elections, were largely caused by Liberal revivals.  Moreover, the high number of 
constituencies described by some historians as safely Unionist/Conservative is obtained by a 
definition of ‘middle class’ which in some cases falls as low as 20% of voters.  The electorate 
in such constituencies must therefore have been up to 80% working class.  Nor were those 
seats decisive, because the party had to win over 100 seats with even larger working-class 
compositions.19  If class in an objective sense did account for Conservative party dominance, 
the paradoxical conclusion must be that this was less because of middle-class support than 
because 'it was the working class party par excellence'.20  
 More fundamental explanations lie in argument, ideology, political culture, strategy 
and policies.  The party did not just organise support placed at its disposal by structural 
changes.  As Conservatives of the time well knew, other aspects of those changes might have 
condemned them to persistent defeat, but for the party's own exertions.  It constructed support 
for itself and turned the new conditions to its own advantage, by capturing previously anti-
Unionist interests, identifying itself with widely-shared values, evoking new opinions, and 
creating difficulties for the rival parties.  In assembling a new electoral base, even more 
socially diverse than that of 1900, the party had two strengths.  Although contending versions 
of Conservatism jeopardised party unity, they also gave it an unusually broad spectrum of 
appeals, from diehard reaction to democratic reform, which could attract an exceptionally 
wide range of voters.  These different appeals – and the different types of party members – 
were held together partly because its main opponents, the Labour party, aroused greater fears 
than Liberals had done before 1914, but mostly because Conservative leaders and 
propagandists exploited and generalised those fears in a peculiarly effective way.  Anti-
socialism was an instinctive Conservative position which now really could consolidate most 
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propertied and business interests as never before, but it did not automatically appeal to large 
numbers of working-class, young, female, and former Liberal-radical voters.  Here the 
immediate post-war problems of severe industrial unrest, inflation, high taxes and 
unemployment helped the party.  McKibbin has shown that Conservatives projected 
stereotypes of male trade-unionised workers as disruptive, greedy and self-interested, in order 
to marginalise the Labour party as sectional and divisive.  This effect reinforced a further 
ideological manipulation, exploiting simple economic assumptions about the importance of 
stable money and balanced budgets to stigmatise Labour policies as dangerous to the well-
being of all classes.  As most workers did not belong to trade unions and were liable to be 
discomforted by industrial disputes, and as most women were chiefly concerned with home, 
family and the domestic budget, this hostile representation of the Labour movement reached 
across objective class distinctions.  In contrast, Conservatives successfully defined themselves 
in contrast as the party of the 'public interest'.21   
 Yet on its own a negative and aggressive anti-Labour and anti-trade union appeal 
would have repelled a decisive range of voters – the moderate, liberal, socially-concerned or 
idealistic; those craving social harmony and disliking political provocation; the voter in the 
many marginal constituencies of a three-party system.  Conservative leaders normally 
understood that success required avoidance of a reputation as reactionary defenders of 
material self-interest, resisting the cruder instincts of party activists and offering a positive 
and accommodating appeal.  However great their fears of potential mass working-class 
support for socialism, many Conservatives drew confidence from their pre-war experience of 
conservative working-class voters.22  In ideology and presentation the crucial figure was 
Baldwin, who became party leader after Law retired with a fatal illness in May 1923.  
Although Baldwin on occasion employed brutal anti-Labour rhetoric – during general 
elections, and the General Strike – he more commonly enunciated an inclusive public 
doctrine.  His rhetoric embraced the new democracy and celebrated liberal political freedoms, 
while deploying the older politics of constitutional defence as the guarantee of stability and 
order.  He matched industrial unrest with moving calls for industrial peace. He competed with 
Labour and Liberalism on the moral high ground, presenting an ethic of responsibility and 
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service.  Against the challenge of class politics, he cast appeals to a shared humanity, 
community, love of nature, history, Christian faith, and patriotism.23  While always subtly 
anti-socialist and Conservative his messages and his tone usually seemed to be 'non-political', 
and as such it assisted a process by which Conservatism became identified with 'the public' 
and with national institutions, and Conservative values became embedded in the innumerable 
social and cultural associations of rural and suburban Britain.24  Baldwin commanded unusual 
respect across party boundaries, and his claim upon shared values was so impressive that he 
could even embarrass and disarm Labour critics.  But his most effective appeal was to many 
former or potential Liberals, enabling him to play a large part in tying together the disparate 
'moral, industrial, agrarian, libertarian, Anglican and nonconformist bodies of resistance' to 
Labour.25   
 At an early stage, however, Baldwin stumbled badly.  The large Labour party advance 
at the 1922 election and the persistence of high unemployment convinced him that Labour 
domination could soon become irresistible, unless pre-empted by a dramatic demonstration of 
Unionist good intentions towards the working population.  He proposed not only to revive  
the most positive Unionist economic policy – tariff reform, now openly called 'protection' – 
but also to call an early general election on the issue.  Yet as after 1903, so again arguments  
about production and work were overwhelmed by those about consumption and prices.  
Although the Chamberlainite Unionists supported the policy, free trade critics created 
another, different, division among Unionists.  Defence of free trade reunited the Asquith and 
Lloyd George Liberals, but while Baldwin probably expected a Liberal revival to neutralise or 
even surpass the Labour challenge, the general election in December 1923 produced an 
increase in both Labour and Liberal MPs, and the loss of an overall Unionist majority (table 
2). 
 This emphasised the strategic problem of a three-party system, and began the first of 
two phases, in 1924 and 1931, of ruthless Unionist-Conservative actions against both of their 
opponents which resolved the problem in their favour, and which enabled the party's other 
strengths – in electoral structure, organisation and ideology – to become effective.  Given the 
aim of assembling an anti-Labour majority, the crucial issue was the allegiance of Liberal 
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voters and the 'moderates' or 'mugwumps' committed neither to Labour nor to Conservatives.  
There were two possible strategies, not necessarily exclusive.  As table 2 indicates, one 
strategy – that of 1918, and preserved in constitutency pacts in 1922 – was to attract these 
voters through alliance with Liberal politicians.  But after the 1923 election the reunited 
Liberal leadership decided to vote against the Unionist government and so allow a Labour 
government to be formed in January 1924.  This ended the Chamberlainites' hope of a 
restored coalition, and so reunited the Unionist party and helped Baldwin to remain party 
leader.  It also converted all Unionists to the alternative strategy – that of seeking to fragment 
and crush the Liberal party, while persuading Liberal politicians and Liberal voters to defect 
to Unionism.  Accordingly, while in opposition to the Labour government Unionist leaders 
both made themselves more attractive to Liberals by dropping protection and offering social 
reform, and exploited  the doubts of many Liberals at their leaders' decision to install 
'socialists' in government.  When the contrasting impacts of Baldwin's 'non-political' appeal 
and the party organisation's relentless stoking of anti-socialist scares (culminating in exposure 
of the 'Zinoviev letter') were added, the effect was devastating: a defecting group of  
'constitutionalist' Liberals (in Churchill's case re-defecting), many local Liberal-Unionist 
election pacts, over 100 fewer Liberal candidates, and a Liberal party collapse at the October 
1924 general election, producing a huge Conservative victory. 
 Under Baldwin, with Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer and Neville 
Chamberlain as Minister of Health, the 1924-1929 government maintained the politics and 
policies of Conservative accommodation towards Liberal opinion and what were thought to 
be the concerns of many working-class and female voters: industrial conciliation, 
minimisation of protection, preservation of unemployment insurance, a large extension of the 
pensions system, public support for slum clearance and increased house-building, improved 
facilities for maternal and child care.  But the government could not overcome chronic 
economic difficulties and mass unemployment, nor wholly resist party pressures for stronger 
'conservative' measures, especially, after the defeat of the General Strike, for anti-trade union 
legislation.  Although most Conservatives expected Baldwin's remarkable personal reputation 
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to secure further victory for them,26 the party was defeated at the May 1929 general election, 
falling back to 38% of the national poll.   
 Again, as at the 1923 election, this was largely an effect of a three-party system, with 
another Liberal revival magnifying a renewed Labour advance amidst the highest-ever 
number of three-cornered contests.  Even though the second Labour government was again in 
a parliamentary minority and the Liberal party was considerably smaller than in 1923-4, the 
effort to address the strategic problem was delayed for two years.  The Conservatives were 
distracted by internal party disputes over tariffs, Empire trade and India, during which 
Baldwin's efforts to remain sensitive towards 'moderate' and Liberal opinion nearly cost him 
his leadership, amidst tides of diehard, imperialist, and protectionist criticism.  The party-
political problem was further complicated by the onset of deep economic depression from late 
1929.  At first it seemed that the Labour government's inability to cope with a mounting 
economic, unemployment and financial crisis and a broad shift of opinion towards protection 
and public expenditure cuts would restore Conservatives to government, assisted as in 1924 
by Liberal defections – since a group of Liberal MPs led by Simon was now prepared to 
accept tariffs as an emergency measure.27 
 In the event, however, the second phase in the destruction of the three-party system 
took a different and far more dramatic form.  The August 1931 sterling and budget crises 
fatally split the Labour Cabinet, but the circumstances created a serious difficulty for 
Conservative leaders.  Instead of winning the next election on the issue of protection, they 
might lose it if they formed a government imposing cuts in unemployment benefits, social 
services, and public-service salaries and wages, and were opposed by a united Labour party 
presenting Conservatives as the party of the rich and confortable minority imposing increased 
hardship on the pooer or hard-pressed masses.  Fearing dangerous repercussions for 
Conservative interests from such an explicit form of class politics, the Conservative leaders 
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instead chose what became a more successful and prolonged version of the 1918 strategy.  
They proposed a coalition under the existing prime minister, even though MacDonald was a 
socialist; they accepted alliance with the Liberal leaders, together with MacDonald's few 
remaining Labour supporters; and they improved upon 1918 by calling the result a 'National 
government'.  This government was intended as a temporary emergency arrangement, but 
during September 1931 the majority of the Labour movement went into outright opposition, 
shifted sharply to the socialist left and resorted to class arguments, while the ‘emergency’ 
government failed in its declared aim of defending the value of sterling and faced the prospect 
of political humiliation.  In these circumstances,  Conservative ministers agreed to maintain 
the atmosphere of 'national crisis' and to preserve the political security of the National 
government at a general election, rather than run any risk of defeat by their party fighting 
independently.  The Labour leadership had now been split, and Conservatives, Liberals and 
'National Labour' arranged hundreds of electoral pacts, crucially reducing the number of 
three-cornered contests (table 3), and together mounted a fierce anti-Labour campaign under a 
'National' cause.  The October 1931 general election produced the largest election victory and 
the largest number of Conservative MPs of modern times.28 
 Here, in the party-political manoeuvres, the creation of a 'National' coalition, and the 
massive anti-Labour electoral and ideological alliance of  autumn 1931, lie the chief reasons 
for the Conservative party's interwar dominance, because the National government continued 
until 1940.  So attractive was this government to Conservative leaders that they went to 
remarkable lengths to preserve it.  When half the Liberal party and some National Labour 
ministers refused to accept Conservative insistence on the final introduction of protection in 
February 1932, an 'agreement to differ' allowed them to criticise the policy publicly yet 
remain in the government.  When these ministers eventually did resign in September 1932, 
rather than form a purely Conservative government Baldwin persuaded MacDonald and the 
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Simon Liberals to continue.  Even after Baldwin succeeded MacDonald as prime minister in 
1935, a National Labour and National Liberal presence was preserved.  The National 
government was continued by Conservative ministers because it allowed them to pursue 
policies – of economic intervention, preservation of social policies and Indian reform – 
which, given attitudes in the Conservative heartlands, would have been difficult for a purely 
Conservative government to undertake.  Above all, the National government enabled their 
version of Conservatism to command much Liberal and 'moderate' support, and so created an 
apparently impregnable barrier to socialism.  At the next general election, in 1935, the main 
threat came not from the Labour party but from a possible alienation of 'liberal' peace opinion 
which disliked the government's programme of rearmament against the military threats of 
Germany and Italy, as likely to encourage an arms race which would cause, rather than 
prevent, another war.  Yet Baldwin's political touch was now so sure that he had little 
difficulty making rearmament palatable as vital to the preservation of peace, by underpinning 
collective security, the League of Nations, and defence of freedom against totalitarianism.29  
Only after the Munich crisis of September 1938 and under the less ideologically-sensitive 
premiership of Neville Chamberlain did the government face effective pressure, as groups of 
Conservative, Liberal and Labour critics of his policies of 'appeasement' began to coalesce 
into a 'national' opposition.  Nevertheless, the first opinion polls organised in Britain, dating 
from early 1939, indicate that the National government would have defeated the Labour party 
if an election had been held in 1940.  A second total war, however, had the reverse political 
effect to that of the first, with Labour rather than Unionists reaping the benefits of not being 
the party in power at the outbreak of war.  As in 1915-16 so in 1940 conditions of 'total war' 
produced a new coalition government, under Churchill's premiership but with Labour leaders 
as equal partners to the Conservatives – occupying positions from which they assisted a 
movement of the ideological and policy agenda towards collectivist economic and social 
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policies, and towards the largest defeat of the Conservative party since 1906. 
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